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NEUROENHANCEMENT,	COERCION,	AND	NEO-LUDDISM		
Alexandre	Erler			Abstract:		This	chapter	addresses	the	claim	that,	as	new	types	of	neuro-intervention	get	developed	allowing	us	to	enhance	various	aspects	of	our	mental	functioning,	we	should	work	to	prevent	the	use	of	such	interventions	from	ever	becoming	the	"new	normal",	that	is,	a	practice	expected	–	even	if	not	directly	required	–	by	employers.	My	response	to	that	claim	is	that,	unlike	compulsion	or	most	cases	of	direct	coercion,	indirect	coercion	to	use	such	neuro-interventions	is,	per	se,	no	more	problematic	than	the	pressure	we	all	find	ourselves	under	to	use	modern	technological	devices	like	computers	or	mobile	phones.	Few	of	us	seem	to	believe	that	special	protections	should	be	introduced	to	protect	contemporary	“Neo-Luddites”	from	such	pressures.	That	being	said,	I	acknowledge	that	separate	factors,	when	present,	can	indeed	render	indirect	coercion	to	enhance	problematic.	The	factors	in	question	include	lack	of	safety,	fostering	adaptation	to	oppressive	circumstances,	and	having	negative	side	effects	that	go	beyond	health.	Nonetheless,	I	stress	that	these	factors	do	not	seem	to	be	necessary	correlates	of	neuroenhancement.		
1. Introduction 	The	ethical	debate	on	the	practice	of	“neuroenhancement”	has	become	a	major	trend	in	the	field	of	neuroethics	in	recent	years.	Neuroenhancement	refers	to	the	use	of	a	range	of	techniques	–	often	biomedical	technologies,	which	will	be	the	focus	of	this	chapter	–	by	healthy	people	with	the	aim	of	improving	their	mental	abilities	and	affective	dispositions	(as	opposed	to	treating	a	disease	or	mental	disorder,	the	purpose	for	which	these	biomedical	technologies	were	developed	in	the	first	place).	One	of	the	most	widely	discussed	examples	of	such	a	practice	has	been	the	use	of	psycho-stimulants	like	amphetamine	(Adderall),	methylphenidate	(Ritalin)	or	modafinil	(Provigil)	by	students	on	various	University	campuses	looking	for	a	study	aid	(see	e.g.	Greely	et	al.,	2008).	Such	substances	are	sought	for	their	purported	beneficial	effects	on	concentration,	memory,	and	wakefulness,	but	also,	as	has	recently	emerged,	because	they	
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increase	some	users’	energy	levels	and	motivation	to	engage	in	academic	work	(see	e.g.	Vrecko,	2013;	Ilieva	and	Farah,	2013).1	In	this	regard,	psycho-stimulants	are	proving	more	similar	than	previously	thought	to	another	kind	of	intervention	that	had	been	discussed	even	earlier,	namely	the	enhancement	of	mood	and	personality	using	antidepressant	drugs	like	Prozac.	Psychiatrist	Peter	Kramer	kick-started	the	ethical	debate	on	this	latter	practice	with	his	book	Listening	to	
Prozac,	in	which	he	reported	anecdotes	of	formerly	depressed	patients	who,	even	after	they	had	gotten	better	(or	so	he	reports),	requested	to	stay	on	the	drug	on	grounds	that	it	gave	them	(among	other	things)	a	more	socially	appealing	personality	–	for	instance,	more	extroverted,	and	less	prone	to	negative	affect	(Kramer,	1993).2	More	recently,	increasing	attention	has	also	been	given	to	various	forms	of	brain	stimulation,	such	as	transcranial	magnetic	stimulation	(TMS)	and	transcranial	direct	current	stimulation	(tDCS),	which	in	addition	to	their	relevance	for	the	treatment	of	conditions	like	depression	and	schizophrenia,	show	the	potential	to	enhance	both	mood	and	cognitive	functions	like	memory,	mathematical	ability,	and	language	learning	(Cohen	Kadosh	et	al.,	2012;	Coffman	et	al.,	2014;	Meinzer	et	al.,	2014;	Santoni	de	Sio	et	al.,	2014).	Other	interventions	have	also	been	discussed,	such	as	the	prospect	of	technologically	improving	people’s	moral	dispositions,	e.g.	by	reducing	racial	bias	or	the	propensity	to	violent	aggression	(Douglas,	2008	and	2013;	Harris,	2011;	Focquaert	and	Schermer,	2015).	More	futuristic	forms	of	neuroenhancement	include	neural	implants	that	would	allow	us	to	connect	our	brain	directly	to	computers,	thereby	allowing	our	cognitive	capacities	to	benefit	from	the	exponential	gains	that	have	characterized	machine	intelligence	for	the	past	half-century	at	least	(Kurzweil,	2005).		1	To	be	precise,	we	ought	to	distinguish	among	such	effects	between	those	that	involve	performance	enhancement,	and	those	involving	performance	maintenance	(Ranisch	et	al.,	2013).	The	former	category	of	effects	allow	the	user	to	reach	a	level	of	performance	that	she	could	not	reach	otherwise	(e.g.	to	remember	a	greater	amount	of	information	than	she	could	without	the	enhancement).	Effects	of	the	latter	category,	by	contrast,	prevent	one’s	performance	level	from	deteriorating	in	the	face	of	detrimental	factors	like	fatigue.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	will	use	the	term	«	neuroenhancement	»	to	cover	both	performance	enhancement	and	performance	maintenance.	2	Though	Kramer’s	book	raises	fascinating	philosophical	questions	and	may	well	foreshadow	what	will	become	possible	in	the	future,	let	me	note	however	that	his	heavy	reliance	on	personal	anecdotes	(rather	than	on	large-scale	data	from	peer-reviewed	studies)	should	make	us	cautious	before	assuming	that	the	sort	of	durable	personality	enhancement	he	describes	is	truly	something	we	can	already	achieve	today,	whether	with	Prozac	or	any	other	current	method.	
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	One	of	the	main	ethical	concerns	that	have	been	raised	about	neuroenhancement	interventions,	and	the	one	on	which	the	present	chapter	will	focus,	is	the	issue	of	
coercion.	The	notion	of	coercion	comes	in	a	variety	of	forms,	so	a	few	conceptual	clarifications	are	in	order	here.	First,	in	the	context	of	the	neuroenhancement	debate,	it	is	common	to	distinguish	between	direct	and	indirect	coercion	(Greely	et	al.,	2008;	Farah,	2012;	Dubljevic,	2013).	A	paradigm	example	of	direct	coercion	to	enhance	would	be	an	employer	making	the	willingness	to	use	neuroenhancers	an	explicit	requirement	of	a	particular	position	(see	the	contribution	by	Hopkins	and	Fiser	in	the	present	volume):	imagine	a	job	description	stipulating	that	“the	successful	candidate	will	be	willing	to	use	[neuroenhancer	X]	when	necessary”.	The	requirement	need	not	necessarily	be	explicit,	however.	As	long	as	a	company	manager,	for	instance,	expected	all	of	her	employees	to	use	neuroenhancers,	even	if	he	never	stated	his	expectation	in	an	“official”	manner	(but,	say,	solely	relied	on	hints),	direct	coercion	would	be	present.	In	cases	of	indirect	coercion,	by	contrast,	no	one	is	enforcing	an	actual	requirement	to	enhance,	whether	explicit	or	implicit.	The	pressure	to	enhance	does	not	come	directly	from	a	recognized	authority,	but	is	rather	the	by-product	of	something	else,	such	as	expectations	about	productivity.	Suppose	that	some	neuroenhancer	successfully	boosts	productivity	in	some	particular	activity,	and	that	a	number	of	people	are	using	it	for	that	purpose.	If	an	employer	tends	to	hire	the	most	productive	people	in	that	area,	while	having	no	particular	expectations	about	neuroenhancement	use	itself,	all	applicants	for	this	type	of	job	will	nevertheless	find	themselves	–	indirectly	–	under	pressure	to	take	neuroenhancers	to	increase	their	competitiveness.3	This	second,	indirect	form	of	coercion	is	the	one	that	a	number	of	students	report	being	faced	with	in	relation	to	psychostimulant	use,	in	their	quest	to	get	good	grades	(e.g.	Forlini	and	Racine	2009;	Partridge	et	al.,	2013).		
	3	At	least	all	those	who	do	not	already	enjoy	(say,	because	of	natural	talent)	a	competitive	advantage	so	great	that	they	can	expect	to	remain	ahead	even	if	their	less	talented	competitors	start	using	neuroenhancers,	and	they	do	not.	
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Secondly,	it	is	also	useful	to	distinguish	between	what	I	shall	call	“unconditional”	and	“conditional”	coercion.	Unconditional	coercion,	as	I	shall	define	it,	occurs	when	someone	is	forced	or	pressured	to	use	some	intervention	in	circumstances	where	one	could	not	reasonably	be	expected	to	defy	the	pressures	and	refuse	to	use	that	intervention.	Unconditional	coercion	on	my	definition	does	not	entail	that	a	person	simply	has	no	choice	about	whether	or	not	to	accept	some	form	of	neuroenhancement	–	this	would	represent	compulsion,	a	more	extreme	scenario.	Rather,	in	cases	of	unconditional	coercion,	one	can	still	make	that	choice,	but	the	alternatives	to	enhancement	are	all	highly	undesirable,	to	the	point	that	one		cannot	reasonably	expect	the	agent	to	embrace	any	of	those	alternatives.4	To	illustrate,	suppose	that,	as	some	authors	believe	might	become	appropriate	in	the	future	(e.g.	Persson	and	Savulescu,	2008),	we	were	to	make	it	a	legal	requirement	for	everyone	to	undergo	moral	enhancement	using	biomedical	means,	on	the	grounds	that	this	were	necessary	to	avoid	a	global	catastrophe.	There	are	various	ways	in	which	we	could	implement	such	a	requirement.	We	could	for	instance	punish	non-compliance	with	imprisonment:	this	would	be	an	example	of	unconditional	coercion	in	my	sense	(one	would	still	have	the	choice	to	resist	the	enhancement	by	going	to	jail,	although	hardly	anyone	could	reasonably	be	expected	to	make	it	and	face	its	consequences).	Alternatively,	though	this	would	be	even	more	difficult	to	defend,	we	could	put	a	moral	enhancement	drug	into	the	water	supply,	unbeknownst	to	consumers	(so	that	no	one	could	decide	to	escape	the	drug	by	drinking	only	bottled	water),	or	we	could	force-feed	it	to	those	who	refused	to	take	it.	These	latter	two	courses	of	action	would	constitute	compulsion	(avoiding	taking	the	drug	would	not	be	an	option	at	all).	Most	would	agree	that	compulsion	to	enhance	would	be	ethically	wrong,	except	perhaps	in	highly	exceptional	circumstances,	which	is	why	I	will	not	discuss	it	very	much	at	all	in	this	chapter.		Conditional	coercion,	on	the	other	hand,	concerns	cases	in	which	the	pressure	to	use	the	relevant	intervention	occurs	in	the	presence	of	at	least	acceptable	alternatives	for	the	agent,	so	that	she	can	reasonably	be	expected	to	pursue	one	of	those	alternatives	if	she	does	not	wish	to	undergo	the	intervention.	The		4	I	thank	Nicole	Vincent	for	helping	me	see	the	significance	of	this	distinction.	
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inability	to	work	for	a	certain	company	because	one	refused	to	use	neuroenhancers,	in	the	example	cited	above,	would	thus	represent	an	instance	of	conditional	coercion	in	my	sense	–	provided	that	other	acceptable	careers	that	did	not	require	the	willingness	to	enhance	were	available	to	that	person	(otherwise,	we	would	have	crossed	the	line	into	unconditional	coercion).5	Let	me	add	that	it	is	only	appropriate	to	talk	about	someone	being	conditionally	coerced	(or	facing	conditional	coercion)	in	cases	where	the	person	does	want,	for	example,	to	exercise	the	profession	for	which	neuroenhancement	is	required.	If	someone	had	no	interest	in	any	occupation	where	such	a	requirement	was	present,	it	would	seem	inappropriate	to	say	that	this	person	was	being	coerced,	even	conditionally,	to	enhance	herself,	just	because	she	would	be	ineligible	for	any	such	occupation	given	her	rejection	of	neuroenhancement.		It	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	the	distinction	between	unconditional	and	conditional	coercion	is	not	meant	to	imply	the	existence	of	a	sharp	dividing	line	between	the	two.	Rather,	paradigmatic	cases	of	unconditional	and	conditional	coercion	represent	two	ends	of	a	spectrum,	with	many	intermediary	cases	in	between.	First,	the	number	of	acceptable	alternatives	to	jobs	that	required	neuroenhancement	could	be	greater	or	smaller,	and	cases	where	many	such	alternatives	were	available	would	represent	clearer	instances	of	conditional	coercion	than	cases	where	only	one	or	two	such	alternatives	were	available	(which	would	be	much	closer	to	unconditional	coercion).	Secondly,	what	counts	as	an	“acceptable”	alternative	is	certainly,	to	some	extent,	open	to	debate.	For	instance,	imagine	a	situation	in	which	neuroenhancement	use	has	become	a	precondition	of	getting	a	University	degree,	because	it	is	now	so	widespread	that	the	bar	for	what	counts	as	satisfactory	academic	work	has	been	raised	–	to	a	level	that	hardly	anyone	can	reach	without	the	help	of	neuroenhancers.	Would		5	Coercion	to	enhance	could	also	come	about	after	one	had	already	embarked	on	a	particular	career,	if	the	use	of	neuroenhancers	gradually	became	expected	from	those	pursuing	such	a	career,	even	though	this	expectation	wasn’t	present	originally.	The	coercion	could	either	be	conditional,	if	the	person	subjected	to	it	could	still	reasonably	be	expected	to	transition	to	a	different,	sufficiently	desirable	career	where	neuroenhancement	was	not	mandated;	or	unconditional,	if	such	a	thing	could	not	reasonably	be	expected	from	that	person.	Furthermore,	what	was	originally	conditional	coercion	could	also	gradually	become	unconditional,	if	acceptable	alternatives	to	the	agent’s	chosen	career	initially	existed	but	eventually	disappeared	as	enhancement	made	its	way	through	society.	
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we	then	be	dealing	with	conditional	or	unconditional	coercion	to	enhance?	Some	might	claim	that	the	latter	is	true,	arguing	that	a	University	degree	has	become	all	but	a	necessity	in	modern	society	and	that	the	lack	of	it	entails	costs	one	cannot	reasonably	be	expected	to	bear,	whereas	others	might	disagree,	pointing	to	various	careers	that	do	not	require	a	University	education.	Controversial	cases	are	therefore	possible.	Still,	the	existence	of	a	grey	area	does	not	mean	that	there	are	no	clear-cut	examples	of	each	kind	of	coercion,	such	as	those	described	in	the	previous	paragraphs.	A	further,	interesting	question	which	I	cannot	explore	in	depth	here	is	the	extent	to	which	the	subjective	perspective	of	the	agent	herself	might	determine	what	counts	as	an	acceptable	alternative.	I	will	limit	myself	to	suggesting	that	the	agent’s	own	judgment	need	not	necessarily	be	decisive	in	this	regard.	We	should	at	least	make	room	for	the	possibility	that	someone	might	suffer	from	either:	(a)	false	consciousness,	and	fail	to	recognize	that	the	only	options	available	to	her	were	very	poor	ones	(e.g.	working	conditions	involving	mistreatment);	or	(b)	expensive	tastes,	leading	her	to	discount	options	that	the	overwhelming	majority	of	us	would	regard	as	perfectly	acceptable	(think	of	someone	who	refused	to	acknowledge	any	other	profession	than	that	of	supermodel	as	a	desirable	career	path).		In	a	professional	context,	occupations	where	use	of	idealized	(and	in	some	cases,	already	existing)	neuroenhancers	might	plausibly	become	mandated	or	at	least	expected	by	employers	seem	numerous,	in	view	of	the	various	ways	in	which	it	could	improve	job	performance.	To	give	but	a	few	examples,	one	study	found	that	the	drug	modafinil	had	a	beneficial	impact	on	the	memory	and	decision-making	capacity	of	sleep-deprived	doctors	(Sugden	et	al.,	2012).	Similar	benefits	can	be	expected	in	other	professions	where	sleep	loss	is	a	hazard,	such	as	long-haul	truck	drivers,	or	where	a	sharp	focus	over	extended	periods	is	key,	such	as	air	traffic	controllers.6	US	military	pilots	who	refuse	to	take	amphetamines	when		6	It	is	worth	mentioning,	however,	that	the	extent	to	which	currently	available	substances	might	be	suitable	in	those	contexts	is	a	disputed	matter:	to	take	the	example	of	truck	drivers,	stimulants	like	amphetamines	are	actually	believed	to	increase	the	risk	of	traffic	accidents	(despite	their	benefits	for	wakefulness)	due	to	their	side	effects,	which	can	include	agitation,	tachycardia,	and	even	hallucinations	(Girotto	et	al.,	2013).	Modafinil,	by	contrast,	seems	to	hold	greater	promise	in	this	context	(Krueger	and	Leaman,	2011),	though	some	remain	worried	about	its	addictive	potential	(Heinz	et	al.,	2012).	
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asked	to	do	so	can	already	be	denied	the	chance	to	fly	combat	missions,	with	potentially	damaging	consequences	for	their	career	(Mehlman,	2004)	–	though	the	military	is	now	reported	to	be	turning	to	the	safer	alternative	represented	by	modafinil	(Mehlman,	2015).	A	caveat	we	ought	to	add	here	is	that	the	likelihood	that	people	will	come	under	pressure	to	use	neuroenhancers	like	modafinil	partly	depends	on	future	advances	in	artificial	intelligence	and	the	automation	of	tasks	that	they	allow.	For	example,	self-driving	trucks,	which	could	drive	for	many	hours	with	no	breaks	and	while	maximizing	fuel	efficiency,	are	already	at	an	advanced	stage	of	development,	leading	some	to	expect	massive	job	losses	among	truck	drivers	in	the	relatively	near	future	(Meola,	2016).	In	areas	where	technology	can	thus	substitute	for	human	workers,	concerns	about	coercion	to	enhance	may	well	prove	irrelevant.	That	said,	all	occupations	are	not	equally	vulnerable	to	automation,	and	as	long	as	humans	are	needed	in	the	workforce,	especially	for	complex	and	cognitively	demanding	tasks,	the	prospect	of	neuroenhancement	will	retain	its	appeal.	In	fact,	this	appeal	might	be	increased	if	neuroenhancement	can	help	people	keep	up	with	the	performance	levels	attained	by	machines	and	thereby	preserve	at	least	some	of	their	competitiveness	in	the	face	of	automation.		When	it	comes	to	the	technological	manipulation	of	affect	and	personality,	the	correlation	between	the	display	of	positive	emotion	by	employees	and	customer	satisfaction	in	virtually	all	forms	of	customer	service	is	well	established	(e.g.	Pugh,	2001),	though	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	authenticity	of	such	displays	appears	to	matter	as	well	(Andrzejewski	and	Mooney,	2016).	Insofar	as	employees	high	in	traits	like	agreeableness	and	extroversion,	and	low	in	negative	affect,	tend	to	be	preferred	to	others	for	such	jobs,	those	who	“naturally”	fall	short	in	those	areas	might	feel	the	pressure	to	use	neuroenhancers,	which	–	should	they	prove	able	to	produce	such	effects,	at	least	in	the	future	–	would	likely	provide	a	more	effective	and	reliable	path	to	the	desired	qualities	than	more	traditional	methods	of	emotion	management	(Kramer,	1993).	A	conscientiousness	enhancer	might	enjoy	even	broader	appeal,	given	the	demonstrated	association	between	that	trait	and	academic	and	job	performance	(Higgins	et	al.,	2007).	
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	When	discussing	neuroenhancement	interventions	in	what	follows,	I	shall	assume	that	they	are	effective.	Admittedly,	as	we	have	just	seen,	this	is	an	assumption	for	which	the	current	empirical	evidence	is	mixed	(depending	for	instance	on	the	type	of	effect	sought	and	on	the	context	of	use)	when	it	comes	to	existing	interventions,	which	means	that	my	discussion	will	be	speculative	to	some	degree.7	In	principle,	coercion	(both	direct	and	indirect)	to	undergo	such	interventions	could	occur	even	if	that	assumption	were	mistaken	–	or	at	least	the	perception	of	it	could,	with	similar	consequences.	Suppose	it	turned	out,	for	instance,	that	the	stimulants	currently	popular	among	some	University	students	do	not	in	fact	help	them	achieve	better	grades	but	simply	create	a	false	perception	that	they	do.	As	long	as	this	perception	was	widespread	enough,	students	could	feel	pressured	to	take	those	substances.	If	this	were	the	case,	however,	the	natural	way	to	alleviate	such	pressures	would	be	to	run	large-scale	information	campaigns	about	the	ineffectiveness	of	psychostimulants	as	study	aids,	which	would	also	highlight	the	risks	(if	any)	that	they	posed	to	health,	and	could	be	combined	with	further	disincentives	depending	on	the	magnitude	of	those	risks.	A	further	assumption	behind	my	analysis	is	that	the	interventions	in	question	are	undertaken	by	competent	adults	on	themselves;	I	shall	leave	aside	their	use	on	children,	which	raises	additional	ethical	worries.	Even	focusing	on	the	adult	context,	some	people	–	philosophers	and	non-philosophers	alike	–	worry	that	the	spread	of	neuroenhancements	throughout	society	could	lead	to	the	establishment	of	a	“new	normal”	(Vincent	and	Jane,	2014),	with	most	people	coming	under	pressure	to	use	those	technologies,	even	if	they	would	ideally	prefer	not	to,	on	pain	of	facing	significant	social	and	economic	penalties.	The	concern	here	seems	to	be	that	even	indirect	coercion	of	this	kind	would	be	ethically	problematic	in	itself,	which	implies	that	we	ought	to	take	active	steps	to	protect	people	from	it,	although	this	may	not	justify	going	so	far	as	prohibiting	others	from	enhancing	themselves.8		7	In	particular,	there	is	currently	little	evidence	that	neuroenhancers	like	psychostimulants	can	be	used	by	healthy	people	on	a	regular	basis,	rather	than	just	occasionally,	without	ever	losing	their	effect	and	fostering	tolerance.	8	Authors	who	raise	the	coercion	worry	also	include	Farah,	2002;	Caplan,	2003;	Mehlman,	2004;	Chatterjee,	2006;	Appel,	2008;	Forlini	and	Racine,	2009;	and	Dubljevic,	2013.	Greely	and	
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	Is	this	concern	about	indirect	coercion	justified?	I	will	suggest	that	it	is	not	–	at	least	not	insofar	as	it	entails	that	such	coercion	to	enhance	should	worry	us	per	
se.	I	shall	proceed	by	highlighting	our	attitudes	towards	existing	forms	of	coercion	to	use	technology,	and	by	arguing	that	our	stance	on	neuroenhancement	needs	to	be	consistent	with	those	attitudes.	While	the	fact	that	pressures	to	use	neuroenhancers	limit	people’s	freedom	of	choice	does	count	in	favour	of	countering	such	pressures,	I	will	argue	that	this	consideration	is	outweighed	by	the	many	benefits	we	could	expect	from	a	widespread	adoption	of	neuroenhancement.	If	so,	the	value	of	personal	freedom	of	choice	and	the	badness	of	coercion	are	not	sufficient,	by	themselves,	to	justify	setting	up	any	special	safeguards	to	protect	people	against	indirect	coercion	to	enhance,	whether	conditional	or	unconditional.	The	advent	of	a	“new	normal”	involving	neuroenhancers	thus	need	not,	in	itself,	be	of	concern	to	us.	That	said,	I	will	add	two	concessions.	First,	I	agree	that	people’s	right	to	bodily	integrity	demands	that	they	should	be	protected	from	compulsion	to	enhance,	as	well	as	from	most	instances	of	direct	coercion	to	do	so	(although	there	might	be	exceptions	in	that	latter	case).	Secondly,	I	will	acknowledge	that	other	important	considerations,	distinct	from	coercion	itself,	can	when	present	give	us	good	grounds	for	introducing	special	legal	safeguards	even	against	indirect	coercion.	Furthermore,	even	when	such	safeguards	are	not	warranted,	it	remains	desirable	to	encourage,	whenever	possible,	gestures	of	good	will	(e.g.	the	adoption	of	special	accommodations)	towards	those	who	for	whatever	reason	might	not	wish	to	use	neuroenhancers.	I	will	then	conclude	by	responding	to	a	few	possible	objections	to	my	analysis.	
2. Possible strategies against indirect coercion to enhance 	Before	considering	whether	the	importance	of	protecting	people’s	freedom	does	warrant	measures	to	forestall	the	rise	of	indirect	coercion	to	enhance,	let	us	 	colleagues	also	mention	it	(Greely	et	al.,	2008),	but	suggest	–	correctly,	as	I	will	argue	later	–	that	the	need	for	safeguards	against	such	coercion	depends	on	the	safety	profile	of	the	relevant	interventions.	
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briefly	consider	some	measures	that	might	be	introduced	to	that	effect.	The	most	radical	one	would	obviously	be	an	outright	ban	on	the	use	of	neuroenhancers	by	the	healthy	(while	still	allowing	of	course	for	therapeutic	uses	of	those	same	substances	or	devices).	In	effect,	this	is	already	how	drugs	like	methylphenidate	or	modafinil	are	regulated	in	the	United	States,	since	it	is	illegal	to	purchase	them	there	without	a	prescription.9	While	such	regulation	is	chiefly	the	responsibility	of	governmental	agencies	like	the	Drug	Enforcement	Administration	(DEA)	and	the	Food	and	Drug	Administration	(FDA),	there	have	also	been	private	initiatives.	In	the	academic	context,	Duke	University	thus	set	a	precedent	in	2011	by	modifying	their	official	policy	on	academic	dishonesty	in	precisely	such	a	direction:	the	“unauthorized	use	of	prescription	medication	to	enhance	academic	performance”	was	added	to	the	types	of	act	constituting	cheating	(Duke	University,	2011).	The	type	of	proposal	we	are	considering	would	require	extending	such	restrictive	measures	(which	ultimately	would	have	to	be	government-enforced,	rather	than	left	to	the	discretion	of	private	actors)	to	all	neuroenhancement	interventions,	including	some,	such	as	tDCS,	which	are	currently	commercially	available	to	the	public	(as	illustrated	by	the	much-discussed	headset	sold	by	company	foc.us).10		One	ethical	difficulty	that	has	been	pointed	out	about	this	strategy	is	that,	in	order	to	protect	the	freedom	of	those	who	do	not	want	to	have	to	enhance	themselves,	it	impinges	upon	the	freedom	of	those	who	would	like	to	use	those	interventions	(Farah,	2002;	Hall,	2004).	Why	exactly	should	the	freedom	of	the	former	be	given	more	weight	than	that	of	the	latter?	I	shall	argue	later	that	a	persuasive	justification	can	be	offered	for	such	a	difference	of	treatment,	but	that	it	needs	to	appeal	to	considerations	distinct	from	freedom.	The	attempt	at	a	full-fledged	ban	on	neuroenhancement	use	would	also	face	implementation	challenges,	given	that	the	already	existing	black	market	would	likely	further	expand,	and	that	some	people	might	still	gain	access	legally	to	the	relevant		9	Even	though	they	are	not	regarded	as	equivalent	in	terms	of	their	abuse	potential,	with	methylphenidate	being	classified	as	a	schedule	II	drug,	and	modafinil	only	as	schedule	IV	(Sahakian	and	LaBuzetta,	2013,	p.	148).	10	Whether	such	devices	currently	sold	to	the	public	do	have	enhancing	effects	has	been	contested.	For	instance,	one	study	found	that	the	foc.us	headset	actually	had	a	negative	impact	on	working	memory	(Steenbergen	et	al.,	2016).	
	 11	
interventions	for	enhancement	purposes	either	by	faking	the	symptoms	of	a	disorder,	or	by	finding	a	doctor	willing	to	facilitate	their	non-medical	use.	For	the	moment,	nevertheless,	let	us	keep	in	mind	the	possibility	of	outright	prohibition	for	the	sheer	sake	of	preventing	indirect	coercion.	What	more	moderate	alternatives	could	we	pursue?		Another	option	that	has	been	suggested	would	involve	some	form	of	collective	action:	as	workers	and	citizens,	we	could	take	a	stand	together	against	the	demand	for	ever-increased	productivity	and	the	other	social	expectations	that	drive	the	use	of	neuroenhancers.	Among	other	things,	this	would	involve	voluntarily	refraining	from	using	such	interventions	while	the	choice	is	still	up	to	us	(Forlini	&	Racine,	2009;	Vincent	&	Jane,	2014).11	However,	given	the	strong	interest	that	many	have	in	becoming	more	effective	at	doing	their	job	(and	in	having	at	least	some	other	people	become	more	effective	too),	whether	for	positional	or	non-positional	reasons,	one	might	doubt	that	the	necessary	critical	mass	of	people	could	be	won	over	to	prevent	indirect	and	conditional	(and	ultimately,	perhaps	even	unconditional)	coercion	from	arising	–	at	least	on	the	assumption	that	the	appeal	of	neuroenhancers	were	not	diminished	by	concerns	about	safety,	or	by	prohibitive	prices	that	could	not	be	brought	down.12	If	such	voluntary	initiatives	are	not	viable,	we	might	have	to	turn	again	to	laws	and	regulations	.		Thirdly,	we	could	try	to	make	the	choice	to	enhance	less	appealing,	while	staying	away	from	a	ban,	for	instance	by	imposing	financial	(taxes)	and	regulatory	burdens	(licensing	procedures)	on	those	who	chose	to	use	the	relevant	interventions	in	the	absence	of	a	medical	need	(for	such	a	proposal,	see	e.g.	Dubljevic,	2013).	A	possible	challenge	for	that	strategy	is	that	the	choice	to	enhance,	by	contrast	for	instance	with	the	choice	to	smoke,	will	often	be	driven		11	For	the	sake	of	accuracy,	let	me	note	that	these	two	articles	are	focused	on	the	specific	issue	of	
cognitive	enhancement.	However,	the	points	they	make	about	the	need	to	prevent	coercion	seem	to	apply	just	as	well	to	other	forms	of	neuroenhancement.	12	In	the	latter	case,	coercion	might	still	affect	the	few	wealthy	people	who	could	afford	the	relevant	interventions.	Others	would	strictly	speaking	be	protected	from	such	coercion	by	their	insufficient	means,	given	that	being	coerced	into	doing	something	arguably	presupposes	being	able	to	do	do	that	thing.	This	economically	less	advantaged	group	might	instead	simply	suffer	the	consequences	of	such	a	new	competitive	disadvantage	without	being	able	to	do	anything	about	it.	
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by	expectations	of	economic	benefits.	If	neuroenhancers	led	to	better	work	performance,	which	led	to	greater	opportunities	for	career	advancement	and	eventually	to	a	higher	income,	then	the	burdens	to	be	borne	to	use	those	interventions	might	merely	represent	an	investment	which	could	be	expected	to	yield	a	high	return	once	the	employee	has	started	reaping	the	benefits	of	superior	performance.	The	burdens	in	question	would	thus	have	to	be	very	heavy	in	order	to	deter	a	high	enough	number	of	people	so	as	to	forestall	coercion	(in	which	case	the	threat	of	increasing	socio-economic	inequalities	might	arise,	if	only	the	wealthy	found	it	profitable	to	invest	in	neuroenhancement	use).	Furthermore,	this	proposal	would	again	likely	face	the	challenges	of	a	black	market,	and	of	some	people	circumventing	the	economic	burdens	either	by	faking	symptoms	or	with	the	help	of	“liberal-minded”	doctors.		On	reflection,	we	may	question	whether	any	of	those	strategies	(or	further	alternatives	that	I	may	not	have	considered)	would	be	successful	in	staving	off	the	rise	of	indirect	coercion	to	enhance.	Let	us,	however,	set	those	doubts	aside,	and	assume	that	at	least	one	of	these	would	work	well	enough	(which	particular	one	might	be	superior	is	not	crucial	to	the	rest	of	my	discussion).	Would	we	then	be	justified	in	implementing	it	simply	for	the	sake	of	protecting	people	from	such	coercion?	I	now	want	to	defend	a	negative	answer	to	that	question.	
3. Freedom, Neo-Luddites, and the “new normal” 	Consider	the	attitude	that	our	society	appears	to	take	towards	those	referred	to	as	“Neo-Luddites”:13	that	is,	people	who,	for	ethical	or	religious	reasons,	or	simply	out	of	personal	preference,	disapprove	of	most	modern	technology,	including	computers,	mobile	phones,	the	internet,	and	sometimes	ATMs	and	cars.	Examples	of	contemporary	Neo-Luddites	include,	among	religious	groups,	the	Amish,	and	among	secular	figures,	authors	like	Chellis	Glendinning,	Kirkpatrick	Sale,	and	the	infamous	“Unabomber”	Ted	Kaczynski	(a	rather	isolated	case	in	his		13	Named	after	the	original	“Luddites”,	a	group	of	English	textile	workers	who	protested	against	the	evolution	of	their	working	conditions	in	the	early	19th-Century,	including	the	introduction	of	technological	devices	that	diminished	the	need	for	skilled	laborers.	One	tactic	they	employed	involved	attacking	loom	factories	and	destroying	machines	(Banning,	2001).	
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espousal	of	violent	activism).	Though	Neo-Luddites	differ	in	the	specific	grounds	of	their	opposition	to	modern	technology,	they	tend	to	accuse	it	of	weakening	communities,	undermining	worthy	traditions,	promoting	warfare,	destroying	the	environment,	revealing	human	hubris	in	our	pretension	to	achieve	dominion	over	nature,	and	encouraging	“a	mechanistic	approach	to	life”	(Glendinning,	1990;	see	also	Sale,	1995).	In	our	technologically-oriented	society,	in	which	Neo-Luddites	are	presumably	a	minority,	there	is	no	doubt	that	many	professional,	economic	and	political	opportunities	will	be	closed	to	them	if	they	act	on	their	dislike	of	modern	technological	devices.	And	while	this	loss	of	opportunity	still	does	not,	for	the	most	part,	translate	into	coercion	in	the	case	of	the	Amish,	who	form	a	largely	independent	community	with	–	for	the	most	part	–	no	wish	to	join	the	broader	society,	the	same	cannot	be	said	of	secular	Neo-Luddites	who	are	part	of	the	dominant	culture.	Many	jobs	in	that	culture	thus	require	both	the	willingness	and	ability	to	use	computers,	email,	and	the	internet;	in	a	number	of	cases,	the	only	way	to	apply	for	a	job	is	online.	Even	when	no	actual	requirement	to	use	them	is	present,	rejection	of	those	technologies	will	still	put	one	at	a	competitive	disadvantage	by	closing	off	important	sources	of	information	and	channels	for	communication.	Public	libraries	often	offer	computerized	catalogues	exclusively.	Computers	are	found	in	virtually	any	car	manufactured	today.	And	so	on.	Secular	Neo-Luddites	thus	face	both	direct	and	indirect	coercion	to	use	devices	they	would	prefer	not	to	use	(and	which	in	fact	they	would	prefer	to	see	eliminated).	Even	their	most	prominent	activists	have	made	concessions	to	the	tech	world	for	the	sake	of	promoting	their	ideas:	the	books	of	Glendinning	and	Sale	can	thus	be	purchased	on	Amazon.	(Some	are	even	available	in	Kindle	format.)14		Nonetheless,	I	take	it,	most	of	us	do	not	believe	that	the	pressures	bearing	on	all	members	of	our	society	to	adopt	those	technologies,	and	the	costs	to	be	faced	for	refusing	to	do	so,	are	ethically	unacceptable,	and	that	new	anti-discrimination	laws	should	be	passed	to	protect	Neo-Luddites	from	such	costs.	Imagine	a	
	14	In	fact,	Sale	now	appears	to	have	resigned	himself	to	the	inexorable	march	of	technology	and	to	the	coercive	pressures	that	come	with	it:	in	a	recent	interview,	he	describes	attempts	to	continue	the	Neo-Luddite	battle	as	“futile”	(Hill,	2014).	
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committed	–	though	perhaps	not	very	pragmatic	–	Neo-Luddite	who	wishes	to	pursue	an	academic	career,	which	he	expects	would	help	his	views	gain	respectability	and	influence	the	thinkers	of	tomorrow,	yet	is	unwilling	to	make	any	compromise	with	regard	to	his	anti-technology	convictions.	It	may	well	be	
nice	if	the	institutions	to	which	he	applied	for	positions	were	willing	to	make	special	arrangements	for	him	out	of	respect	for	his	personal	beliefs,	and	allowed	him	for	example	to	send	only	hard	copies	of	his	application	documents,	or,	assuming	he	were	to	be	hired,	to	allow	him	not	to	use	email	(thereby	becoming	the	envy	of	his	colleagues	besieged	by	messages),	and	to	write	his	academic	papers	by	hand,	or	on	a	typewriter,	to	be	then	converted	into	electronic	format	by	another	staff	member	when	necessary.	Yet	it	nevertheless	does	not	seem	that	it	would	be	wrong	of	the	university,	or	discriminatory,	to	decline	to	consider	this	person’s	application	if	he	refused	to	comply	with	their	initial	expectations	–	even	though	the	fact	that	this	person	could	not	pursue	an	academic	career	due	to	his	rigid	personal	convictions	might	still	strike	us	as	regrettable,	and	as	something	it	would	be	desirable	to	avoid	when	possible	by	allowing	such	special	provisions	to	be	made.		Does	our	attitude	reflect	mere	prejudice,	or	can	it	be	supported	by	argument?	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	generalized	use	of	computers,	email,	mobile	phones	and	other	instances	of	modern	technology	significantly	facilitates	communication	and	coordination	within	companies	and	other	organizations,	which	helps	further	the	legitimate	goals	that	such	entities	pursue,	such	as	greater	efficiency	and	productivity.	And	in	some	cases,	this	can	be	expected	to	benefit	not	only	individual	organizations,	but	society	as	a	whole.	Greater	efficiency	in	conducting	medical	research,	for	instance,	means	that	new	life-saving	treatments	or	vaccines	will	take	less	time	to	arrive.	The	development	of	medical	technology,	from	MRI	machines	to	clinical	decision	support	systems,	has	helped	improve	the	ability	of	physicians	to	diagnose	and	treat	their	patients.	Besides	their	positive	impact	in	the	practice	of	medicine,	computers	are	also	yielding	precious	assistance	in	other	contexts,	such	as	commercial	aviation,	which	is	now	safer	than	it	has	ever	been,	partly	thanks	to	the	role	of	digital	technology	in	preventing	dangerous	situations	from	arising.	Computer	simulations	help	us	predict	the	
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weather	and	make	breakthroughs	in	physics,	engineering	and	various	other	fields.	It	seems	quite	plausible	to	think	that	these	numerous	social	benefits	outweigh	the	badness	of	the	pressures	we	are	under	to	use	those	technologies,	even	if	these	pressures	mean	that	some	(the	Neo-Luddites)	must	go	against	their	own	convictions	to	conform	to	them,	or	face	reduced	opportunities	if	they	refuse.		It	seems	to	me	that	a	similar	argument	could	be	made	about	indirect	coercion	to	use	neuroenhancers.	Indeed,	neuroenhancement	interventions	of	the	sort	we	have	reviewed	at	the	beginning	would,	if	they	could	deliver	on	their	promise,	bring	many	of	the	same	benefits	as	computers,	for	instance.	By	increasing	productivity	and	improving	the	quality	of	service	of	some	workers,	they	would	promote	the	legitimate	goals	of	the	organizations	that	employ	them.	They	would	also	have	broader	social	benefits.	Doctors	who,	thanks	to	neuroenhancers,	reasoned	better	at	the	end	of	a	long	shift	would	be	less	susceptible	to	medical	errors.	Air	traffic	controllers	and	truck	drivers	with	better	focus	and	faster	reaction	times	would	make	road	and	air	travel	even	safer	than	they	are	today,	potentially	saving	many	lives.	Were	neuroenhancement	to	become	the	norm	among	scientists,	the	pace	of	research	might	accelerate,	again	meaning	that	crucial	breakthroughs	(such	as	new	treatments	for	various	diseases)	would	come	sooner.15	Here	again,	it	seems	that	the	expected	social	benefits	outweigh	the	badness	of	the	existence	of	indirect	coercion	to	enhance.	Therefore,	ceteris	
paribus,	our	attitude	to	such	coercion	should	be	the	same	as	our	attitude	to	the	kind	of	coercion	experienced	by	Neo-Luddites	in	the	Digital	Age.		That	said,	since	this	last	statement	is	only	true	ceteris	paribus,	it	does	not	mean	that,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	we	have	no	reason	whatsoever	to	take	preventive	measures	against	indirect	coercion	in	relation	specifically	to	neuroenhancement.		15	As	mentioned	previously,	we	should	remember	that	whether	or	not	neuroenhancement	will	bring	such	benefits	depends	to	some	extent	on	future	advances	in	machine	intelligence.	It	may	be	that	many	of	these	benefits	will	in	fact	be	secured	by	delegating	tasks	to	intelligent	machines,	rather	than	through	a	“neuroenhanced”	workforce.	However,	we	have	also	seen,	first,	that	automation	may	not	affect	all	professions	equally,	at	least	in	the	near	term;	in	some	fields	the	introduction	of	neuroenhancement	might	be	more	relevant	than	in	others.	And	secondly,	even	assuming	significant	progress	in	artificial	intelligence,	neuroenhancement	might	still	help	human	workers	avoid	getting	left	behind	by	machines	in	terms	of	work	performance.	Any	coercive	pressures	that	these	technologies	might	create	should	therefore	be	weighed	against	the	fact	that	they	might	also	contribute	to	protecting	employment	opportunities	for	people!	
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Indeed,	neuroenhancers	of	the	type	I	am	envisaging	might	still	involve	normatively	relevant	differences	with	the	more	familiar	technological	devices	we	have	just	discussed.	When	these	differences	are	present,	they	will	give	us	additional	reasons	–	distinct	from	considerations	of	freedom	and	autonomy	–	to	ensure	that	people	are	protected	from	indirect	coercion	to	enhance,	reasons	that	can	in	principle	outweigh	even	the	significant	benefits	to	be	derived	from	the	general	adoption	of	neuroenhancement.	It	is	to	this	issue	that	I	turn	next.	
4. Reasons why coercion to enhance might be objectionable 	What	considerations	could	make	indirect	coercion	to	use	neuroenhancers	morally	more	problematic	than	coercion	to	use	the	technological	devices	that	represent	the	current	“normal”?	I	will	begin	by	considering	one	difference	that	quickly	comes	to	mind:	the	invasive	nature	of	neuroenhancers,	in	virtue	of	which	any	coercive	pressure	to	use	them	might	be	said	to	violate	people’s	right	to	bodily	integrity.	I	will	argue	that	while	this	consideration	does	show	compulsion	to	enhance,	as	well	as	most	cases	of	direct	coercion,	to	be	ethically	objectionable,	this	does	not	extend	to	indirect	coercion.	I	will	then	look	at	three	other	factors	which	I	do	take,	when	present,	to	render	indirect	coercion	to	enhance	problematic,	and	which	might	misleadingly	suggest	that	such	coercion	is	objectionable	in	its	own	right:	these	factors	are	lack	of	safety,	fostering	adaptation	to	oppressive	circumstances,	and	having	negative	side	effects	that	go	beyond	health.		
4.1 The right to bodily integrity 	Neuro-interventions	of	the	sort	described	above	are	arguably	more	invasive	than	the	use	of	devices	like	computers.	Both	types	of	intervention,	it	may	be	noted,	interfere	with	brain	functioning	in	some	way.	Even	the	mere	act	of	using	a	computer	involves	having	certain	sensory	experiences	(e.g.	visual	sensations	of	a	computer	screen)	that	form	part	of	our	brain	activity,	and	learning,	say,	how	to	type	on	a	keyboard	produces	synaptic	connections	in	our	brain	that	are	different	from	those	we	would	have	developed	had	we	only	ever	relied	on	pen	and	paper,	
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for	instance.	Nevertheless,	computers	and	similar	devices	typically	affect	brain	functioning	only	indirectly,	by	means	of	the	sensory	organs,	whereas	neuroenhancement	interventions	do	so	directly,	by	introducing	a	foreign	element	into	a	person’s	body	or	brain.	In	the	case	of	psychoactive	drugs,	a	chemical	substance	is	introduced	into	the	person’s	body	and	crosses	the	blood-brain	barrier.	And	even	with	an	intervention	like	tDCS,	which	is	often	described	as	“non-invasive”,	an	electric	current	travels	through	a	person’s	scalp	and	skull	to	certain	areas	of	her	brain.		Granting	the	greater	invasiveness	of	neuro-interventions,	what	are	its	normative	implications?	It	might	plausibly	be	argued	that	the	right	to	bodily	integrity	–	that	is,	the	right	to	resist	unwanted	interferences	with	one’s	own	body	–	represents	a	fundamental	human	liberty	that	ought	to	be	protected	by	the	law.	The	common	acceptance	of	such	a	principle	presumably	explains,	for	instance,	why	vaccinations	(another	invasive	procedure)	are,	in	places	like	North	America,	not	mandatory	in	most	professional	contexts.	Many	hospitals	in	the	US	have	made	flu	vaccinations	mandatory	for	healthcare	workers	(Tuttle,	2015),	but	a	number	of	them	also	allow	for	exemptions,	not	just	for	medical	reasons	but	also	for	religious	or	philosophical	ones.	Since	the	right	to	bodily	integrity	does	seem	a	very	important	one,	consistency	with	our	current	practices	would	suggest	that	at	least	most	employers	should	not	be	allowed	to	directly	coerce	their	employees	into	using	neuroenhancers.		That	being	said,	the	same	rationale	does	not	seem	to	apply	to	indirect	coercion.	Take	again	the	example	of	vaccinations.	Perhaps	it	would	be	wrong	of	most	employers	to	indirectly	coerce	their	employees	into	getting	vaccinated,	e.g.	by	showing	preference	for	candidates	with	no	objections	to	vaccination	in	their	hiring	practices.	But	assuming	this	would	indeed	be	wrong,	it	is	presumably	because	employees	who	reject	vaccinations	present	no	serious	risk	of	harming	the	functioning	and	productivity	of	the	companies	they	work	for	(or	the	health	of	their	colleagues).	If	so,	their	employers	lack	any	strong	reason	to	expect	them	to	get	vaccinated.	However,	if	a	person’s	objection	to	vaccinations	could	in	fact	be	expected	to	significantly	hinder	her	productivity	(and	thereby	that	of	the	
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company),	e.g.	by	causing	her	to	take	extended	periods	of	sick	leave,	and	if	that	person	did	not	have	valid	reasons	for	her	view16	(but	held	it,	for	example,	on	the	basis	of	mistaken	empirical	beliefs),	then	it	would	no	longer	seem	problematic	for	an	employer	to	be	less	willing	to	hire	people	holding	such	a	view.	In	line	with	what	I	have	said	in	part	3,	I	would	treat	analogous	cases	involving	indirect	coercion	to	enhance	in	the	same	manner.		What	is	more,	even	in	the	case	of	vaccinations,	not	all	hospitals	incorporate	exemptions	for	healthcare	workers.	In	some	cases,	workers	have	been	fired	for	refusing	vaccination	on	non-medical	grounds	(Tuttle,	2015).	The	reasoning	of	the	employers	in	such	cases	is	that	such	workers	present	a	threat	to	those	around	them,	particularly	patients	with	already	fragile	health.	In	the	case	of	neuroenhancers,	we	have	seen	that	in	some	professions,	they	might	be	expected	to	save	lives,	e.g.	by	reducing	the	number	of	medical	errors	among	doctors.	When	the	stakes	are	so	high,	it	is	no	longer	clear	that	people’s	right	to	bodily	integrity	should	always	trump	the	need	to	prevent	serious	harm	to	people	to	the	greatest	possible	extent.	It	might	therefore	conceivably	be	appropriate,	under	certain	conditions	and	in	certain	professional	contexts,	to	tolerate	even	direct	coercion	(though	not	compulsion)	to	enhance	–	even	though	such	cases	will	presumably	be	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule,	as	most	professions	do	not	involve	stakes	of	that	magnitude.	The	interest	of	a	company	in	maximizing	the	productivity	of	its	employees	for	the	sake	of	profit	clearly	does	not	carry	the	same	ethical	weight	as	society’s	interest	in	avoiding	preventable	deaths	in	contexts	like	medicine	or	air	travel.		For	those	who,	at	this	point,	might	still	have	the	intuition	that	even	indirect	coercion	to	use	neuroenhancers	is	ethically	problematic	because	it	threatens	bodily	integrity,	I	now	want	to	suggest	that	it	might	be	possible	to	explain	that	intuition	by	appeal	to	a	distinct	consideration	–	namely	the	implicit	assumption	that	such	invasive	interventions	present	a	serious	risk	for	users.		 	16	Valid	reasons	could	for	instance	be	medical	ones	(intolerance	to	some	vaccines).	I	will	consider	such	reasons	in	relation	to	neuroenhancement	in	the	next	section.	
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4.2 Safety 	Arguably,	it	is	problematic	when	a	person	is	coerced,	even	in	an	indirect	manner,	into	using	interventions	that	pose	significant	risks	to	her	health.	Very	weighty	considerations	will	be	needed	to	justify	such	a	practice,	and	it	isn’t	clear	that	the	expected	benefits	of	neuroenhancement	just	listed	will	be	weighty	enough.	The	chronic	use	of	psychostimulants	like	Adderall	is	thus	known	to	have	a	variety	of	side	effects,	from	milder	ones	like	dry	mouth	and	insomnia	to	potentially	serious	conditions	including	addiction,	psychosis,	cardiovascular	problems,	and	even	sudden	death	(Lakhan	&	Kirchgessner	2012).	It	would	seem	wrong	to	pressure	doctors	or	air	traffic	controllers	to	compromise	their	health	by	taking	such	substances,	even	if	this	could	be	expected	to	yield	significant	social	benefits.	Similarly,	if	it	were	to	turn	out	that	Ritalin	and	Adderall	use	really	had	become	necessary	for	many	students	to	keep	up	with	their	peers	in	terms	of	academic	performance	(and	was	not	merely	perceived	as	such),	this	might	provide	a	justification	for	an	outright	ban	on	the	non-therapeutic	use	of	those	substances	by	students,	to	be	enforced	by	drug	tests	if	necessary.	While	such	a	system	would	certainly	be	coercive	towards	those	who	wished	to	use	those	stimulants	despite	the	risks	involved,	it	would	be	similar	in	spirit	to,	say,	the	widespread	practice	of	banning	smoking	in	public	places,	in	order	to	forestall	harm	from	passive	smoking.	True,	we	have	seen	that,	already	today,	US	pilots	can	be	pressured	to	use	substances	like	amphetamines	or	modafinil	to	complete	long	flight	missions.	But	first,	taking	such	drugs	is	to	some	extent	in	the	pilots’	own	interest,	insofar	as	it	reduces	their	risk	of	having	a	crash	due	to	fatigue;17	and	secondly,	one	might	argue	that	matters	of	national	defense	are	weightier	than	even	the	sort	of	considerations	I	have	adduced	in	favour	of	neuroenhancement	in	other	contexts.		Importantly,	however,	our	safety-based	reason	to	protect	people	from	coercion	to	enhance	will	only	hold	for	interventions	which,	in	light	of	our	current	knowledge,	do	not	appear	safe	enough.	While	this	likely	applies	to	substances	like	amphetamine,	the	status	of	other	drugs	like	modafinil,	or	of	interventions		17	A	similar	argument	would	apply	in	the	case	of	long-haul	truck	drivers,	yet	in	their	case	there	seems	to	be	more	room	for	adjusting	work	conditions	so	as	to	remove	the	need	for	stimulant	use.	
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like	tDCS,	is	less	clear.	Modafinil	has	so	far	appeared	to	have	a	significantly	better	safety	profile	than	amphetamine,	though	controlled	studies	of	its	long-term	effects	on	healthy	users	are	still	lacking	(Porsdam	Mann	and	Sahakian,	2015).	The	safety	of	tDCS	has	already	been	demonstrated	in	controlled	laboratory	settings,	but	not	yet	in	the	“real”	world	(Dubljevic	et	al.,	2014).	It	might	be	argued	on	that	basis	that	no	one	should	be	pressured	to	become	a	guinea	pig	by	undergoing	interventions	the	long-term	safety	of	which	is	still	in	doubt.	Notice,	however,	that	we	seem	willing	to	tolerate	pressures	of	just	that	kind	in	relation	to	some	familiar	technological	devices:	the	health	effects	of	long	term	mobile	phone	use	are	thus	still	not	known	with	certainty,	and	in	2011	mobile	phone	radiation	was	classified	as	“possibly	carcinogenic”	by	the	International	Agency	for	Research	on	Cancer	(WHO/IARC,	2011;	see	also	Maron,	2016).	Yet	very	few	of	us	are	protesting	at	the	fact	that	avoiding	exposure	to	cell	phone	radiation	is	virtually	impossible	in	our	society.	This	still	doesn’t	mean	that	coercion	to	use	modafinil	or	tDCS	is	necessarily	acceptable	–	for	instance,	modafinil	has	a	number	of	side	effects	that	are	absent	from	mobile	phones,	and	as	we	have	seen,	some	researchers	are	concerned	about	its	addictive	potential	(Volkow	et	al.,	2009;	Heinz	et	al.,	2012).	The	line	at	which	an	intervention	can	be	considered	“safe	enough”	is	a	tricky	one	to	draw,	but	wherever	we	choose	to	draw	it,	it	is	important	not	to	set	more	stringent	standards	for	neuroenhancers	simply	because	they	are	recent	and	unfamiliar,	or	because	some	of	them	bear	the	bad	name	of	“drugs”.		So	far	I	have	been	considering	scenarios	in	which	neuroenhancement	posed	a	health	risk	for	all	or	at	least	most	people.	However,	we	could	also	imagine	a	case	in	which	the	relevant	interventions	were	only	dangerous	for	a	minority	of	people	with	a	specific	bodily	constitution.	The	members	of	that	unlucky	minority	would	then	find	themselves	pressured	to	take	risks	that	most	people	in	their	society	did	not	have	to	face,	in	order	to	remain	competitive	on	the	job	market	(and	perhaps	other	contexts	too).	Would	a	ban	on	most	neuroenhancement	technologies	be	justified	in	that	type	of	case	as	well?	In	light	of	the	expected	benefits	of	a	wide	adoption	of	neuroenhancement,	adopting	such	a	ban	would	seem	difficult	to	defend,	and	would	be	at	odds	with	our	existing	practices.	Consider	for	instance	
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that	people	with	certain	disabling	conditions	(e.g.	osteogenesis	imperfecta,	which	causes	brittle	bones	that	are	prone	to	fracture)	may	face	a	heightened	risk	of	injury	at	their	workplace	or	while	commuting.	As	a	result,	it	may	be	safer	for	these	people	to	work	from	home.	Many	employers,	however,	may	prefer	their	employees	to	be	present	at	the	workplace,	creating	pressures	on	members	of	the	group	with	disabilities	to	face	the	associated	risks.	Still,	our	society	does	not	try	to	counteract	these	pressures	by	forcing	everyone	to	work	at	home,	and	neither	does	it	forbid	employers	to	expect	non-disabled	employees	to	travel	to	the	workplace.	Rather,	people	with	disabilities	are	protected	from	such	pressures	from	prospective	employers	in	two	ways.	The	first	one	is	disability	benefits,	for	those	who	have	difficulty	finding	adequate	employment	and	have	limited	resources	to	live	on.	Secondly,	civil	rights	laws	like	the	American	With	Disabilities	Act	require	employers,	in	certain	cases,	to	provide	“reasonable	accommodations”	for	people	with	disabilities.	This	could	involve	allowing	an	employee	to	work	from	home,	to	come	back	to	the	example	previously	described.	That	said,	employers	are	only	subject	to	such	a	requirement	provided	that	the	accommodation	will	allow	the	employee	to	perform	all	the	essential	functions	of	the	job,	and	that	it	will	not	create	an	“undue	hardship”	for	the	employer	(Zackin	et	al.,	2015).		If	an	unlucky	minority	were	to	emerge	for	whom	neuroenhancement	technologies	presented	a	health	risk,	its	members	should	be	granted	some	of	the	same	legal	protections	as	those	that	people	with	disabilities	enjoy	today.	Which	protections	exactly?	Given	that	the	job	performance	of	workers	who	did	not	use	neuroenhancers	would	usually	be	inferior	to	that	enhanced	workers	(that	is,	after	all,	one	of	the	core	purposes	of	neuroenhancement),18	it	might	be	difficult	to	make	a	persuasive	case	for	requiring	employers	to	show	no	preference	for	enhanced	workers	in	their	hiring	practices.	Offering	a	form	of	compensation	akin	to	disability	benefits	to	those	who	suffered	from	their	inability	to	enhance	themselves	might	be	a	more	defensible	proposal.	Nonetheless,	this	issue	is	a		18	Of	course,	this	might	not	always	be	true,	as	it	would	partly	depend	on	the	magnitude	of	the	enhancement,	as	well	as	on	each	person’s	“natural”	level	of	performance.	E.g.	a	person	of	average	intelligence	who	was	able	to	boost	her	IQ	to	130	thanks	to	neuroenhancement	would	still	not	match	“natural”	geniuses.	
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complex	one	where	the	right	conclusion	might	depend	on	a	number	of	factors,	including	the	magnitude	of	the	health	risks	encountered	by	the	unlucky	minority,	and	the	opportunity	costs	that	would	be	entailed	by	measures	destined	to	secure	equal	employment	prospects	for	the	members	of	that	minority.	Depending	on	the	details	of	the	situation,	we	might	decide	that	adopting	such	measures	would	in	fact	be	appropriate.		I	would	maintain,	however,	that	there	would	be	no	adequate	grounds	for	extending	such	compensatory	or	protective	measures	to	people	who	abstained	from	neuroenhancement	purely	out	of	personal	preference	or	on	the	basis	of	philosophical	or	religious	beliefs	hostile	to	technology,	if	they	faced	no	health	risks	from	the	relevant	procedures	–	just	as	people	who	might	demand	to	work	from	home	for	similar,	non-medical	reasons	would	not	be	entitled	to	any	special	compensation	for,	or	protection	against,	the	associated	loss	in	their	professional	opportunities.		
4.3 Fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances and corrupting a 
person’s affective life 	By	oppressive	circumstances,	I	mean	circumstances	in	which	a	person’s	significant	interests,	potentially	grounding	corresponding	rights,	are	being	disregarded,	with	the	result	that	the	person	is	deprived	of	a	significant	component	of	a	good	human	life.	The	interests	in	question	can	be	varied.	Consider	someone	who	has	just	experienced	the	loss	of	a	close	relative.	Even	though	there	is	no	federal	law	in	the	United	States	requiring	employers	to	grant	“bereavement	leave”	to	employees	who	find	themselves	in	such	a	situation,	many	companies	do	have	policies	granting	a	number	of	days	off	work	(usually	around	three)	to	bereaved	employees,	for	the	purpose	of	allowing	them	to	attend	funeral	services	but	also	to	mourn	their	loss.	(In	some	countries	like	Canada,	this	practice	is	actually	legislated	in	most	jurisdictions.)	Suppose	now	that,	due	to	the	advent	of	a	safe	and	effective	mood	and/or	motivation	enhancer,	companies	with	a	bereavement	leave	policy	decided	to	shorten	or	even	terminate	it,	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	no	longer	necessary	for	their	employees	to	experience	the	
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feelings	of	dejection	that	normally	accompany	bereavement	–	and	that	tend	to	cost	the	company	money	by	temporarily	diminishing	productivity.	It	would	arguably	be	wrong	of	companies	to	deprive	their	employees	of	bereavement	leave	in	this	way	(or	even	to	be	more	willing	to	hire	candidates	who	freely	agreed	to	forfeit	it),	as,	first,	this	would	go	against	the	employees’	significant	interest	in	expressing	their	love	for	the	departed	through	mourning,	and	secondly,	it	would	pressure	them	to	corrupt	their	affective	lives	by	preventing	themselves	from	experiencing	fundamental	human	emotions	that	were	appropriate	to	the	situation	they	were	in.19		Other	examples	could	be	given.	Suppose	for	instance	that	the	customer	service	advisors	of	a	company	came	under	pressure	to	use	a	new	personality	enhancer	that	would	(safely)	give	them	an	unshakeably	agreeable	disposition,	one	they	would	retain	even	when	dealing	with	the	rudest	of	customers,	because	their	managers	expected	this	to	maximize	customer	satisfaction.20	Here	too,	one	might	argue	that	such	pressure	from	their	employer	was	wrong	because	it	required	them	to	adjust	to	oppressive	circumstances:	circumstances	in	which	their	interest	in	defending	themselves	(with	due	politeness)	against	insults,	thereby	preserving	their	self-respect,	would	be	frustrated.	Furthermore,	it	would	again	have	a	corruptive	influence	on	their	character	by	making	them	overly	docile.	While	agreeableness	probably	does	constitute	a	reasonable	requirement	of	positions	of	this	kind,	it	does	not	follow	that	a	customer	service	advisor	should	
always,	even	when	confronted	with	aggressive,	racist,	or	otherwise	disrespectful	people,	behave	agreeably	if	she	is	to	do	her	job	well.		
	19	Admittedly,	this	second	charge	would	especially	apply	if	the	relevant	mood	enhancer	were	to	constantly	affect	the	emotional	state	of	bereaved	employees	as	long	as	they	kept	taking	it.	It	would	have	less	force	in	a	scenario	where	the	effects	of	the	enhancer	were	short-lived	and	dissipated	once	the	working	day	was	over	(provided	that	one	stopped	using	it	until	the	next	morning).	In	the	second	scenario,	unlike	the	first,	the	bereaved	person	could	still	experience	the	“right”	emotions	outside	of	the	work	context.	The	employee’s	high	mood	level	at	work	might	still	be	troubling,	and	coercion	to	artificially	induce	it	would	still	seem	problematic,	but	the	concern	would	be	less	pronounced.	20	From	the	perspective	of	the	managers,	the	intervention	would	thus	count	as	a	personality	enhancer,	even	though	we	may	not	regard	it	that	way.	
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Admittedly,	it	is	less	clear	that	such	a	line	of	argument	could	be	extended	to	employers	who	required	their	employees,	whether	directly	or	indirectly,	to	display	the	maximum	degree	of	agreeableness,	extraversion,	or	sunniness	still	lying	within	the	“healthy”	range	of	those	traits	(so	that	they	didn’t	collapse	into	obsequiousness	or	gullibility),	either	with	a	view	to	promoting	customer	satisfaction,	or	in	order	to	satisfy	their	own	individual	preferences	for	certain	personality	traits.	Indeed,	talk	of	corrupting	the	users’	affective	dispositions	would	no	longer	seem	appropriate	in	such	cases.	And	it	does	seem	appropriate	to	grant	employers	a	certain	leeway	(though	not	an	unlimited	one)	with	respect	to	the	personal	qualities	of	applicants	that	they	can	base	their	hiring	decisions	on.	There	are	at	least	two	types	of	situation	in	which	it	could	be	legitimate	for	an	employer	to	allow	a	candidate’s	personality	to	affect	her	hiring	decision:	first,	if	the	candidate’s	personality	could	be	expected	to	affect	her	future	job	performance,	as	well	as	that	of	the	company	as	a	whole.	And	secondly,	if	her	personality	were	likely	to	affect	the	atmosphere	in	the	workplace.	For	instance,	a	very	unpleasant	person	who	did	not	get	along	with	any	of	her	colleagues	could	compromise	the	performance	of	her	working	group,	even	if	individually	she	were	very	efficient.	And	even	if	she	had	no	negative	impact	on	anyone’s	performance,	because	others	had	learnt	how	to	put	up	with	her	bad	attitude,	she	might	still	negatively	affect	everyone’s	mood	at	the	office.	If	an	employer	had	good	reason	to	foresee	any	of	these	consequences,	it	seems	that	she	would	be	entitled	to	decline	to	hire	this	person	on	account	of	her	disagreeable	personality.		Finally,	suppose	that	some	white-collar	workers	at	a	company	started	using	a	safe	pharmaceutical	that	significantly	boosted	their	motivation	to	work	and	safely	reduced	their	need	for	sleep	to	4	hours	a	night,	thereby	enhancing	their	productivity.	Thanks	to	the	intervention,	they	find	it	easy	to	tolerate	a	120-hour	workweek,	partly	because	they	now	need	less	sleep,	and	partly	because	they	have	a	diminished	interest	in	non-work	related	activities,	including	social	interactions	with	friends	and	family	(to	mirror	an	effect	of	Adderall	described	by	Vrecko,	2013,	p.	9).	Their	personal	life	becomes	impoverished	as	a	result	of	this	workaholic	lifestyle,	but	since	their	foremost	priority	is	career	advancement,	they	are	willing	to	pay	the	price.	Their	superior	productivity	soon	earns	them	the	
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favours	of	the	management	in	the	form	of	promotions	and	bonuses,	inciting	other	workers	to	adopt	the	enhancement	too.	Soon,	enough	people	at	the	company	are	working	100	hours	or	more	a	week	with	the	help	of	neuroenhancers	to	put	pressure	on	the	rest	of	the	employees	to	follow	suit,	on	pain	of	being	viewed	as	setting	everyone	back	and	eventually	losing	their	job.	Slowly,	the	100-hour+	workweek	creeps	into	social	expectations	and	becomes	the	“new	normal”.	Most	of	us,	I	assume,	would	regard	this	as	a	nightmarish	social	development:	as	society	having	adapted	to,	and	promoting,	an	oppressive	workaholic	mindset.21	While	we	may	very	much	welcome	an	enhancer	that	safely	reduced	our	need	for	sleep,	we	would	presumably	still	object	to	it	if	it	also	impacted	our	motivational	set	and	lifestyle	in	this	manner.		All	of	these	examples	involve	the	corruption	of	an	employee’s	affective	life,	as	well	as	an	adaptation	to	oppressive	circumstances	in	which	a	significant	interest	shared	by	all	people	gets	frustrated,	even	though	a	different	interest	is	being	disregarded	in	each	case.	In	the	first	(bereavment)	case,	this	interest	is	the	chance	to	mourn	the	loss	of	a	loved	one;	in	the	second	(customer	service)	case,	it	is	the	ability	to	act	so	as	to	protect	one’s	self-respect;	and	in	the	third	(workaholic)	case,	it	is	the	enjoyment	of	an	adequate	work-life	balance.22	Perhaps	we	could	take	one	step	further	and	add	that	a	corresponding	right	is	also	being	violated	in	each	scenario:	that	is,	respectively,	the	right	to	mourn,	to	self-respect,	and	to	an	adequate	work-life	balance.	The	last	of	these	putative	rights,	however,	might	elicit	the	objection	that	in	contexts	like	the	American	one,	it	is	agreed	that	some	people,	such	as	Wall	Street	bankers,	can	legitimately	be	expected	by	their	employer	to	work	80	to	100	hours	a	week	on	a	regular	basis.		21	One	might	object	that	this	scenario	is	implausible,	because	most	people	would	object	to	such	a	social	development,	including	many	employers	who	desire	work-life	balance	for	themselves,	which	would	prevent	that	state	of	affairs	from	ever	becoming	the	norm.	While	I	very	much	hope	that	this	is	correct,	and	that	the	course	of	action	recommended	by	Vincent	and	Jane	with	regards	to	cognitive	enhancement	would	be	followed	in	relation	to	the	workaholic	pill,	it	nevertheless	seems	at	least	conceivable	that	the	scenario	I	have	described	could	occur:	for	instance,	those	at	the	top	of	the	ladder	might	either	regard	minimal	amounts	of	free	time	as	adequate,	or	they	might	secure	better	conditions	for	themselves	than	for	their	employees,	who	in	turn	might	feel	they	had	no	choice	but	to	accept	such	an	extreme	work	schedule	(and	might	simply	get	progressively	used	to	it).	22	In	addition	to	these,	there	is	presumably	another	interest	(or	even	right)	being	disregarded	in	all	scenarios:	namely	the	interest	in	not	being	pressured	to	corrupt	one’s	own	affective	life	or	character.	
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Unlike	most	European	countries,	the	United	States	does	not	have	regulations	stipulating	a	maximum	number	of	working	hours	per	week	(Kaufman,	2013).23	However,	even	recognizing	such	a	practice	as	legitimate	need	not	conflict	with	the	view	that	everyone,	including	Wall	Street	bankers,	has	a	right	to	work-life	balance	–	one	would	then	just	have	to	add	that	people	can	permissibly	waive	that	right,	if	they	wish	for	instance	to	trade	it	for	an	extremely	lucrative	career.		At	the	regulatory	level,	I	would	argue	that	if	a	scenario	like	the	workaholic	pill	were	ever	to	become	reality,	maximum	working	hours,	of	the	kind	set	out	in	the	Working	Time	Directive	(2003/88/EC)24	of	the	European	Union	(which	sets	the	limit	at	48	hours	per	week	on	average,	though	we	could	debate	whether	this	amount	is	adequate	or	not)	should	be	used	as	a	tool	to	protect	people	from	unconditional	coercion	to	use	such	a	neuroenhancer.	However,	I	leave	it	open	whether	exceptions	to	that	regulation	should	be	allowed	for	certain	occupations	(as	is	the	case	in	countries	like	the	United	Kingdom).	Perhaps	conditional	coercion	to	take	the	workaholic	pill	could	be	tolerated,	as	long	as	we	could	be	confident	that	it	would	remain	confined	to	just	a	few	specific	domains	and	would	not	spread	to	the	rest	of	society.	If	the	risk	of	it	spreading	were	sufficiently	real,	however,	it	would	give	us	a	reason	not	to	allow	any	exceptions	at	all	to	maximum	working	hours.25		Similarly,	when	it	comes	to	the	bereavement	and	the	customer	service	scenarios,	I	would	support	laws	prohibiting	employers	from	directly	or	indirectly	coercing	their	employees	into	using	the	relevant	neuroenhancers,	in	the	spirit	of	existing	laws	meant	to	protect	people	with	disabilities	from	discrimination.	However,	I	would	be	less	inclined	to	consider	the	possibility	of	exempting	certain	employers		23	While	some	jobs	do	require	employers	to	pay	their	employees	more	if	they	make	them	work	beyond	a	certain	number	of	hours	per	week	(so-called	“overtime”),	there	is	no	upper	limit	on	overtime	hours	in	the	US	(Lee	et	al.,	2007).	24	Available	online	at	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003L0088	[accessed	29/6/2016].	25	Let	me	emphasize	that	this	conclusion	applies	to	the	example	of	the	workaholic	pill	as	I	have	specifically	characterized	it.	A	few	tweaks	in	the	example	might	elicit	quite	different	intuitions.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	a	pill	that	safely	cut	our	need	for	sleep	by	half,	but	had	no	impact	on	our	motivational	set,	we	might	not	necessarily	object	if	part	of	the	waking	time	thus	gained	were	devoted	to	working	a	few	more	hours	per	week.	
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or	professions	from	such	regulations	than	in	the	case	of	working	time,	because	the	human	goods	that	would	then	be	sacrificed	are	arguably	of	even	greater	ethical	importance	than	work-life	balance	is.	While	sacrifices	of	work-life	balance	are	viewed	as	undesirable	yet	are	commonly	tolerated	provided	that	they	are	only	temporary,	someone	who	sacrificed	their	self-respect,	even	temporarily,	would	usually	be	considered	as	having	suffered	a	serious	ill,	not	just	an	inconvenience.		
4.4 Negative side effects that go beyond health 
	Even	if	the	coercion	to	enhance	did	not	foster	adaptation	to	oppressive	circumstances,	it	could	still	have	serious	negative	side	effects,	impacting	not	the	person’s	health	but	rather	her	well-being	or	interests.26	These	side	effects	could	mean	that	the	person	now	had	maladaptive	emotional	and	behavioral	dispositions,	but	they	could	also	simply	consist	in	a	large	amount	of	unnecessary	psychological	suffering.	Consider	again	the	example	of	workers	seeking	to	increase	their	productivity.	Rather	than	resorting	to	a	workaholic	pill,	they	might	use	a	neuroenhancer	that	gave	them	laser-like	focus	and	cleared	their	thinking,	allowing	them	to	get	more	done	within	a	given	amount	of	time	and	with	no	loss	of	quality.	Suppose,	however,	that	the	effects	of	the	intervention	do	not	dissipate	as	soon	as	the	working	day	is	over,	but	persist	until	late	into	the	night,	as	a	result	of	which	users	strike	those	around	them	as	being	constantly	hyper-focused,	lacking	in	spontaneity,	and	incapable	of	relaxing.	Their	social	and	personal	life	would	therefore	suffer,	even	though	the	length	of	their	work	week	might	not	be	excessive	(unlike	the	workaholics,	they	don’t	work	longer	hours,	just	more	effectively)	and	their	general	work	conditions,	not	oppressive.27		26	Which	by	the	definition	given	in	section	4.3,	would	mean	ultimately	creating	oppressive	circumstances	for	the	person	–	but	this	time	would	not	foster	adaptation	to	such	circumstances.	27	This	contrast	is	sometimes	overlooked.	My	impression	is	that	the	common	worry	that	neuroenhancement	will	unavoidably	promote	oppressive	imperatives	of	performance	and	productivity	only	derives	plausibility	from	the	fact	that,	usually,	these	imperatives	demand	sacrificing	our	work-life	balance,	or	health	(or	both).	But	in	principle,	neuroenhancement	need	not	demand	sacrificing	either:	e.g.	it	might	simply	make	us	more	effective	and	productive	by	making	us	smarter.	There	is	nothing	intrinsically	oppressive	about	demanding	that	people	use	more	rather	than	less	effective	tools	to	improve	their	job	performance,	provided	that	the	use	of	these	tools	is	safe	enough.	
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	Other,	similar	examples	could	be	offered:	for	instance,	one	could	imagine	employees	(say,	waiters	in	busy	establishments)	being	pressured	to	use	memory	enhancers	to	perform	better	at	work,	and	then	becoming	tormented	by	unwanted,	unpleasant	memories	they	otherwise	wouldn’t	have	retained	(Erler,	2011).	Again,	if	the	use	of	such	interventions	were	to	spread	because	of	the	competitive	advantage	they	conferred	at	work,	thereby	putting	pressure	on	people	to	use	them	and	suffer	the	consequences,	we	would	have	a	problematic	scenario	that	might	require	imposing	disincentives,	or	even	a	complete	ban	if	necessary,	on	the	use	of	the	relevant	interventions,	to	protect	people	from	coercion	to	use	them.	The	general	thing	to	note	about	scenarios	of	this	kind	is	that	this	particular	reason	to	object	to	such	coercive	pressures	would	disappear	if	the	interventions	in	question	could	be	fine-tuned	to	the	point	where	they	no	longer	had	such	negative	side	effects.	For	instance,	it	might	be	possible	to	ensure	that	the	effects	of	some	neuro-intervention	didn’t	last	longer	than	the	period	of	time	during	which	they	were	desired	(i.e.	working	hours),	either	by	using	an	intervention	that	only	had	short-term	effects	and	adjusting	one’s	intake	accordingly,	or	by	using	another	intervention	to	cancel	out	the	effects	of	the	first	when	needed.28		There	are,	therefore,	a	variety	of	reasons	why	indirect	coercion	to	enhance	might	prove	objectionable,	including,	to	recapitulate,	the	fact	that	it	might	pose	a	threat	to	the	health	of	users;	that	it	might	foster	adaptation	to	oppressive	circumstances;	and	finally,	that	it	might	have	harmful	side	effects	other	than	health	effects.	Nevertheless,	these	reasons	are	distinct	from	the	intrinsic	badness	of	coercion	itself.	This	means	that,	if	an	effective	neuroenhancer	turned	out	to	be	available	that	avoided	these	various	ethical	pitfalls	(and	any	other	I	may	have	omitted),	there	would	be	no	good	grounds	for	regarding	coercion	to	use	that	intervention	as	ethically	problematic.	Or	at	least,	such	coercion	would	be	no	
	28	No	doubt,	such	a	process	may	not	be	without	its	own	complications.	Counteracting	the	potential	undesirable	side	effects	of	memory	enhancement	by	blunting	or	erasing	memories,	for	instance,	would	raise	a	number	of	issues:	is	there	a	risk	that	people	might	go	too	far	in	re-writing	their	own	memories?	How	far	is	“too	far”?	And	even	if	one	only	wished	to	mimic	“normal”,	healthy	forgetfulness,	how	would	one	even	know	what	that	concretely	meant?	
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more	problematic	than	the	one	we	already	tolerate	in	relation	to	the	technological	devices	to	which	Neo-Luddites	are	hostile.	
5. Possible objections 	I	will	conclude	by	considering	potential	objections	that	might	be	leveled	at	the	analysis	I	have	offered.	As	I	cannot	pretend	to	be	exhaustive,	I	will	limit	myself	to	three	that	come	readily	to	mind.		
5.1 Cognitive liberty 
 First,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	position	I	have	defended	neglects	people’s	right	to	cognitive	liberty	–	which	has	been	characterized	as	“a	right	to	(and	not	to)	direct,	modify,	or	enhance	one’s	thought	processes”	(Sententia,	2013,	p.356;	see	also	Bublitz,	2013).	Such	an	important	right,	it	might	be	said,	would	be	threatened	by	coercive	pressures	–	even	of	the	indirect	kind	–	to	use	neuroenhancers,	whereas	that	is	not	the	case	with	the	pressures	to	use	computers	and	other	similar	technological	devices	that	we	already	tolerate.	Indeed,	the	argument	would	go,	while	neuroenhancers	clearly	involve	the	modification	and	enhancement	of	our	thought	processes	(that	is,	after	all,	their	very	purpose!),	one	might	find	it	less	clear	that	tools	like	computers	do	so	as	well.	After	all,	unless	we	accept	the	somewhat	controversial	thesis	of	the	extended	mind,	we	may	doubt	that	the	use	of	computers	or	smart	phones	improves,	say,	our	concentration	or	memory	(in	fact,	we	may	fear	that	it	impairs	those	capacities!),	no	matter	how	useful	these	devices	might	be	in	other	ways.	If	there	were	indeed	such	a	difference	between	neuroenhancers	and	more	traditional	technological	devices,	they	would	call	into	question	my	claim	that	indirect	coercion	to	use	the	former	should	be	regarded	as	ethically	on	a	par	with	similar	coercion	to	use	the	latter	(which	as	we	have	seen	is	not	usually	considered	problematic).			
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For	the	most	part,	however,	this	objection	does	not	stand	up	to	scrutiny.	(I	will	add	two	caveats	in	a	moment.)	Working	on	a	computer	for	many	hours,	by	impacting	our	sensory	experience,	certainly	modifies	our	thought	processes	(compared	to	what	they	would	be	if	we	were	using	different	tools	to	do	our	work).	Furthermore,	computers	that	provide	us	with	information	we	couldn’t	have	obtained	otherwise	(such	as	those	that	allow	us	to	run	weather	forecast	models),	or	help	us	make	complex	decisions	(such	as	clinical	decision	support	systems),	arguably	enhance	our	thought	processes	or	at	least	our	ability	to	make	decisions	(e.g.	whether	to	go	for	an	evening	walk,	or	to	stay	home	because	the	weather	is	likely	to	turn	inclement).	Even	if	it	became	difficult	and	penalizing	–	as	it	already	is	to	some	extent	–	to	avoid	relying	on	those	devices	for	the	purpose	of	weather	forecasting,	making	a	medical	diagnosis,	and	in	other	contexts,	should	we	object	to	that	state	of	affairs	on	the	grounds	that	it	constituted	an	illegitimate	infringement	on	our	cognitive	liberty?29	If	not,	then	that	notion	does	not	justify	objecting,	either,	to	a	“new	normal”	that	involved	neuroenhancers.		That	being	said,	it	should	be	acknowledged,	first,	that	this	objection	may	have	greater	plausibility	when	applied	to	compulsion	to	enhance.	Physically	forcing	someone,	against	their	will,	to	use	a	computer,	or	to	watch	a	certain	movie,	would	typically	be	wrong,	and	this	might	partly	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	it	would	involve	an	interference	with	their	thought	processes	to	which	they	had	not	consented	(not	even	implicitly)	and	were,	on	the	contrary,	opposed.	In	cases	of	indirect	coercion,	however,	interventions	are	not	imposed	on	users	without	their	consent	(even	though	they	may	resent	the	pressures	that	they	face	to	use	those	interventions).		Secondly,	there	is	one	particular	type	of	indirect	coercion	to	enhance	that	would	indeed	raise	legitimate	concerns	about	potential	infringements	of	cognitive	liberty:	namely,	coercion	to	use	neural	implants	that	would	be	vulnerable	to	hacking.	This	would	especially	apply	to	implants	that	got	connected	–	at	least	occasionally	–	to	the	internet,	in	order	for	instance	to	vastly	expand	the	amount		29	There	are	various	other	ways	in	which	people	are	expected	to	modify	their	minds	for	professional	purposes:	think	of	employee	training	programs,	for	instance.	
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of	information	directly	accessible	to	a	person’s	mind,	or	to	enable	“telepathic”	communication	between	the	brains	of	two	different	people,	who	could	be	located	in	opposite	parts	of	the	planet.	Hackers	could	conceivably	break	into	such	a	system	and	gain	access,	say,	to	a	person’s	private	memories	stored	in	digital	form.	Worse,	they	might	even	be	able	to	tinker	with	those	memories,	or	with	some	of	the	person’s	thought	processes,	and	ultimately	influence	the	person’s	behavior	by	taking	control	of	her	implant	(a	process	that	has	been	dubbed	“brainjacking”;	see	Pycroft	et	al.,	2016).	Such	actions	would	constitute	serious	violations	of	privacy	and	cognitive	liberty,	and	there	would	be	solid	grounds	for	working	to	prevent	even	indirect	coercion	to	use	interventions	that	put	one	at	a	non-trivial	risk	of	suffering	such	harms.	Presumably,	this	concern	only	applies	to	a	subset	of	neural	implants,	provided	that	it	is	possible	to	create	hacker-proof	implants	(if	only	by	confining	them	to	offline	use),	yet	it	is	an	important	one	to	bear	in	mind	nonetheless.		
5.2 Isn’t there something to the Neo-Luddites’ arguments? 
 A	second	possible	objection	would	be	that	I	have	been	too	quick	to	assume	that	there	is	nothing	problematic	about	the	sort	of	pressures	we	already	tolerate	in	relation	to	technology	use.	Isn’t	there	more	to	the	Neo-Luddites’	arguments	than	I	have	been	willing	to	recognize?	After	all,	the	global	increase	in	computer	use	has	brought	a	number	of	health	issues,	such	as	visual	and	musculoskeletal	problems.	I	have	already	mentioned	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	impact	of	long	term	mobile	phone	use	on	health.	Used	laptops,	mobile	phones,	digital	cameras	and	other	electronic	devices	are	being	dumped	by	the	millions	into	developing	countries,	where	they	are	dismantled	in	often	unsafe	conditions,	leading	to	environmental	damage	and	harmful	effects	on	the	health	of	local	populations.	As	a	result	of	the	ubiquity	of	mobile	phones,	many	employees	are	now	expected	to	be	reachable	on	an	almost	constant	basis,	allowing	working	time	to	seep	into	their	private	lives	and	elevating	their	stress	levels.	Finally,	there	is	evidence	that	the	use	of	computers	and	cell	phones,	while	allowing	people’s	social	networks	to	spread	out	through	geographic	space,	has	simultaneously	led	to	a	reduction	in	the	probability	of	face-to-face	encounters	
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with	family	and	friends,	and	promotes	a	wider	array	of	weak	social	ties	rather	than	more	localized	yet	stronger	ties	(e.g.	McPherson	et	al.,	2006),	which	some	might	interpret	as	vindicating	the	Neo-Luddites’	concern	about	the	weakening	of	community	ties	due	to	the	spread	of	technology.		While	these	may	all	be	valid	concerns,	two	things	should	be	noted	here.	First,	it	isn’t	clear	that	recognizing	their	force	implies	that	we	should	accept	the	validity	of	the	Neo-Luddite	position	on	modern	technology.	For	one	thing,	the	Neo-Luddites	fail	to	acknowledge	the	many	benefits	it	brings,	and	which	need	to	be	weighed	against	its	drawbacks;	for	another	thing,	it	may	be	possible	to	address	these	drawbacks	otherwise	than	through	the	radical	solution	of	turning	away	from	such	technology.	The	musculoskeletal	disorders	experienced	by	many	computer	users	can	be	prevented	by,	for	instance,	maintaining	good	posture	and	taking	frequent	breaks.	The	harmful	effects	of	electronic	waste	could	be	dealt	with	by	promoting	recycling,	as	well	as	inciting	manufacturers	to	design	devices	in	a	more	environmentally-friendly	way	(so	they	can	be	repaired	and	recycled	wherever	possible)	and	discouraging	planned	obsolescence.30	As	for	the	negative	social	effects	of	computer	and	cell	phone	use,	they	can	be	mitigated	by	working	to	change	our	attitudes	and	behavior:	e.g.	by	deliberately	limiting	our	use	of	those	devices	(especially	outside	of	work)	to	make	time	for	real-life	interactions,	and	by	negotiating	with	employers	so	that	expectations	about	being	reachable	remain	as	much	as	possible	confined	within	certain	limits	and	do	not	extend,	for	instance,	into	vacation	time.		But	more	importantly,	even	if	we	assume	that	there	is	in	fact	more	to	the	Neo-Luddite	view	than	I	have	been	willing	to	acknowledge,	this	still	wouldn’t	contradict	the	central	claim	I	have	defended:	namely	that	the	sheer	existence	of	coercion	to	use	modern	technology	is	not	in	itself	bad	enough	to	warrant	taking	measures	to	counteract	it,	whether	in	relation	to	technological	devices	like		30	By	its	very	nature,	of	course,	technological	progress	makes	the	phenomenon	of	obsolescence	unavoidable,	and	we	may	well	be	seeing	it	evolve	at	a	faster	rate	today	than	it	ever	has	previously.	Still,	this	should	not	be	equated	with	the	notion	of	planned	obsolescence,	which	involves	deliberate	efforts	to	shorten	a	product’s	lifespan	so	as	to	force	consumers	to	buy	a	replacement	sooner	(even	though	the	replacement	product	need	not	improve	in	any	way	upon	its	predecessor).	
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computers	or	to	neuroenhancers.	While	adopting	the	Neo-Luddite	proposal	would	admittedly	eliminate	coercion	to	use	such	technology,	it	nevertheless	wouldn’t	do	so	for	the	sheer	sake	of	eliminating	it,	but	rather	on	the	basis	of	distinct	considerations,	such	as	those	just	listed	(health,	social	harms,	and	environmental	damage).	Set	aside	those	considerations,	and	technology	use	again	appears	overall	desirable	in	light	of	the	expected	benefits,	even	if	it	leads	to	some	degree	of	coercion.		
5.3 Wouldn’t the “new normal” create oppressive circumstances? 	This	reply	can	help	us	answer	a	third	and	final	objection,	which	would	ask	what	prevents	Neo-Luddites	themselves	from	arguing	that	they	have	a	significant	interest	in	staying	away	from	computers	and	also,	presumably,	from	neuroenhancers.	After	all,	whatever	one	thinks	of	their	beliefs	about	technology,	they	surely	have	a	strong	interest	in	being	able	to	live	in	accordance	with	them.	Such	an	ability	does	seem	to	represent	an	important	component	of	a	good	human	life.	On	my	own	account,	then,	can’t	the	Neo-Luddites	complain	of	being	forced	to	adjust	to	oppressive	circumstances?	And	won’t	the	same	be	true	of	all	the	opponents	to	neuroenhancement,	if	it	ever	becomes	the	new	normal?		Two	things	should	be	said	in	response.	First,	it	is	not	clear	that	Neo-Luddites	are	completely	unable	to	live	in	accordance	with	their	personal	beliefs,	even	amid	the	ubiquity	of	modern	technology	in	contemporary	society.	Indeed,	they	can	still	avoid	using	such	technology	whenever	possible,	and	express	their	condemnation	of	it	in	oral	or	written	form,	as	authors	like	Sale	and	Glendinning	have	been	doing.	Admittedly,	there	is	a	significant	cost	to	such	avoidance,	and	sometimes	avoidance	is	simply	not	an	option,	in	which	case	compromises	are	required.	But	this	is	still	not	the	same	as	having	no	leeway	to	follow	one’s	Neo-Luddite	beliefs.	Similar	remarks	would	apply	to	those	who	opposed	neuroenhancement	in	a	world	in	which	it	had	become	the	“new	normal”.		It	might	be	objected	here	that	the	compromises	that	people	with	such	convictions	would	have	to	make	would	be	very	significant	indeed,	and	that	this	
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would	largely	deprive	them	of	the	good	of	being	able	to	follow	these	convictions.	This	leads	me	to	my	second	point:	the	extent	to	which	such	people	can	be	said	to	be	facing	oppressive	circumstances	and	to	be	deprived	of	an	important	human	good	partly	arguably	depends	on	the	plausiblity	of	the	beliefs	that	they	want	to	follow.	And	I	would	claim	that,	because	those	beliefs	are	not	supported	by	truly	persuasive	arguments	in	the	case	of	the	Neo-Luddites	and	of	those	who	oppose	neuroenhancement	under	any	form,	the	good	that	these	people	might	miss	out	on	by	living	in	a	society	where	such	interventions	have	become	the	norm	is	not	of	the	same	magnitude	as	the	sacrifice	of	one’s	self-respect	or	the	long-term	loss	of	work-life	balance.	As	a	result,	their	circumstances	are	not	plausibly	characterized	as	oppressive,	even	though	they	may	experience	them	as	such.	Being	unable	to	fully	live	out	one’s	personal	philosophy	is	not	necessarily	enough,	absent	any	constraints	on	the	content	of	that	philosophy,	to	count	as	finding	oneself	in	oppressive	circumstances.	People	whose	personal	philosophy	or	religion	tells	them	that	friendships	are	vicious,	or	that	civilization	is	evil,	arguably	do	not	count	as	living	in	oppressive	circumstances	if	they	find	themselves	unable	to	avoid	all	friendships	or	all	contact	with	the	fruits	of	modern	civilization	–	even	though	society	should	avoid	hindering	their	pursuit	of	their	own	conception	of	the	good,	provided	that	this	does	not	entail	unacceptable	social	costs.31		
6. Conclusion 	If	the	central	argument	I	have	presented	here	is	correct,	the	prospect	of	neuroenhancement	becoming	the	“new	normal”	is	not,	in	itself,	a	proper	source	of	ethical	concern,	insofar	as	the	coercive	pressures	it	would	create	would	be	of	the	indirect	type	(as	opposed	to	compulsion	and	most	cases	of	direct	coercion,	which	are	indeed	problematic	in	themselves	and	should	be	forestalled	by		31	And	if	we	suppose,	again,	that	the	Neo-Luddite	position	is	in	fact	more	plausible	than	I	incline	to	believe,	it	might	then	become	appropriate	to	say	that	Neo-Luddites	are	currently	facing	oppressive	circumstances.	But	this	would	not	simply	be	because	they	are	unable	to	fully	live	in	accordance	with	their	personal	philosophy:	rather,	it	would	be	because	they	are	(by	hypothesis)	suffering	the	harms	from	technology	that	that	philosophy	has	identified.	
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appropriate	regulation).	Nevertheless,	there	are	various	distinct	factors	that	could	make	the	advent	of	this	“new	normal”	problematic.	I	have	tried	to	spell	out	what	these	factors	might	be.			The	question	then	becomes:	once	we	acknowledge	the	relevance	of	those	factors,	will	we	end	up	agreeing,	when	it	comes	to	regulating	neuroenhancement,	with	those	who	believe	that	coercion	to	enhance	should	be	opposed	as	such?	The	answer	will	depend	on	whether	neuroenhancers	already	exist,	or	at	least	can	reasonably	be	anticipated	in	the	near	future,	that	are	both	effective,	safe,	and	can	be	widely	used	without	leading	to	the	ethical	pitfalls	I	have	described.	Further	empirical	evidence	will	be	needed	to	establish	this.	At	any	rate,	given	the	contingent	nature	of	the	link	between	these	pitfalls	and	neuroenhancement	use,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	about	what	our	justification	is	if	we	do	decide	that	safeguards	against	indirect	coercion	are	needed,	so	that	we	can	identify	what	sort	of	future,	improved	interventions	might	in	principle	render	that	justification	obsolete.	Whether	or	not	such	safeguards	are	appropriate,	however,	it	remains	desirable	for	society	to	promote,	within	the	limits	of	practicality,	a	spirit	of	tolerance	for	dissenters	from	technology	that	would	mitigate	the	costs	they	will	unavoidably	have	to	bear	as	a	consequence	of	their	personal	beliefs.		Word	count:	13,209	w.	(including	footnotes,	excluding	references)			
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